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THE IMPACT OF THE FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE
CORPORATION IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 1991 ON THE UNITED
STATES PAYMENTS SYSTEM
Robert G. Ballen* and Joseph P. Savage**
I. Introduction
Congress spent much of 1990
and 1991 vigorously debating pro-
posed comprehensive reforms to
present banking law. However, the
package of so-called bank reforms
Congress ultimately passed - the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corpo-
ration Improvement Act of 1991
("FDICIA") - hardly represented
comprehensive bank reform. Con-
gress jettisoned most of the contro-
versial provisions that would have
permitted banks or their affiliates
to offer new financial services or
expand across state lines, because a
sufficient consensus could not be
reached on these issues. As a result,
Congress largely left the current
legislative and regulatory scheme
regarding bank powers and inter-
state banking intact. Congress
chose instead to recapitalize the
Bank Insurance Fund of the Feder-
al Deposit Insurance Corporation
("FDIC"), strengthen federal regu-
lators' authority to take prompt
corrective action with respect to
troubled financial institutions, in-
crease supervision of foreign
banks, and require "truth-in-sav-
ings" deposit disclosures by depos-
itary institutions.'
Lost amid the hue and cry over
bank securities, insurance powers,
interstate banking and the like
were several important provisions
Congress included in FDICIA that
will have a significant impact on
the United States payments sys-
tem. Because the rules that govern
the payments system critically af-
fect the rights of consumers and
commercial parties to payment
transactions, it is important that
these parties become aware of how
FDICIA has modified present pay-
ment rules.
This Article reviews the provi-
sions of FDICIA that impact the
payments system, including in par-
ticular, amendments to the Expe-
dited Funds Availability Act
("EFAA") - the federal statute
that provides when a bank's con-
sumers must be provided access to
their deposited funds. The Article
first provides an overview of the
EFAA and the requirements it im-
poses on depository institutions.
The Article next reviews the
amendments to the EFAA under
FDICIA. Lastly, the Article dis-
cusses certain other provisions of
FDICIA concerning payments net-
ting arrangements and interbank
exposure, as well as certain pay-
ments provisions which were pro-
posed but not included in the bill
passed by Congress.
II. Overview Of The Act
Congress enacted the EFAA in
August, 1987, as part of the Compet-
itive Equality Banking Act of 1987.2
The EFAA was enacted to address
the practice of certain banks of
delaying customer access to funds
deposited in the customers' own
bank accounts for apparently inordi-
nate periods of time. On May 13,
1988, the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System ("FRB")
promulgated Regulation CC to im-
plement the EFAA.3
The EFAA and Regulation CC
establish specified time periods
within which banks must make
funds available to customers for
deposits to their accounts. 4 Gener-
ally for check deposits, these avail-
ability requirements are based up-
on the type of deposit and the
location of the bank at which the
check is first deposited relative to
the location of the bank on which
the check is drawn. The bank
where the check is first deposited is
called the depositary bank and the
bank where the check is drawn is
called the paying bank. In certain
instances, pursuant to Regulation
CC, banks must provide next-day
funds availability. Banks must
make funds available on the next
business day following the day of
deposit for deposits of cash, elec-
tronic payments, certain govern-
ment checks, the first $100 of a
day's check deposits to an account,
certain checks deposited at the
bank upon which they were drawn,
referred to as "on-us" items, and
certain cashier's, certified, and tell-
er's checks.5
Pursuant to the EFAA, Regula-
tion CC establishes temporary and
permanent availability schedules
for deposits of checks not covered
under the next-day availability
provisions. Under the temporary
availability schedule, which was
effective from September 1, 1988,
until August 31, 1990, a bank was
required to make funds available
by the third business day after the
day of deposit for a local check and
by the seventh business day after
the day of deposit for a nonlocal
check. A local check is a check
where the paying bank is located in
the same check-processing region
as the depositary bank. A nonlocal
check is a check where the paying
bank is outside the depositary
bank's check processing region. A
depositary bank was required un-
der the temporary availability
schedule to make funds deposited
at nonproprietary automated teller
machines ("ATMs") available not
later than the seventh business day
following the day of deposit. 6 An
ATM is nonproprietary if it is not
owned or operated by the deposi-
tary bank, not located on the prem-
ises of the depositary bank, and not
located within 50 feet of the depos-
itary bank's premises unless identi-
fied as being owned or operated by
another entity.7
Under the permanent availabili-
ty schedule, which became effec-
tive on September 1, 1990 and
remains effective today, a deposi-
tary bank is required to make
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funds available for withdrawal on
the second business day following
the day of deposit of a local check
and on the fifth business day fol-
lowing the day of deposit of a
nonlocal check.8 The EFAA, as
originally enacted, provided that,
under the permanent schedule,
cash and checks deposited at non-
proprietary ATMs were to be treat-
ed in the same manner as if they
had been deposited to a teller.9
However, as discussed in more
detail below, Congress recently
amended this provision of the
EFAA to make permanent the
treatment of deposits at nonpropri-
etary ATMs as provided under the
temporary schedule; this permits
all deposits at nonproprietary
ATMs to be treated as nonlocal
checks.
The EFAA and Regulation CC
provide certain exceptions to the
mandated funds availability sched-
ules, including exceptions for new
accounts, large deposits, redeposit-
ed checks, repeated overdrafts, cer-
tain instances in which there is
reasonable cause to doubt the col-
lectibility of a check, and certain
emergency situations.' 0 As origi-
nally enacted, the EFAA did not
permit a bank to invoke these
exceptions with respect to items
for which next-day funds availabil-
ity must be given, such as govern-
ment checks or cashier's checks."
However, as discussed below, FDI-
CIA amended these provisions to
allow safeguard exceptions to be
invoked with respect to checks that
otherwise require next-day funds
availability and liberalized the cus-
tomer notification requirements
for invoking these exceptions.
The EFAA and Regulation CC
require a bank to disclose to its
existing and potential customers
its funds availability policy, and
this disclosure must reflect the
policy followed by the bank in
most cases. 2 Thus, a disclosure
that states that the bank will make
funds available consistent with the
maximum time periods permitted
by the EFAA will not satisfy this
requirement if the bank's practice
in most cases is, in fact, to make
funds available sooner.
Subpart C of Regulation CC was
promulgated pursuant to the
FRB's authority under the EFAA
to improve the check collection
and check return system. Subpart
C requires a paying bank that
determines not to pay a check and
a returning bank, which is any
bank other than the paying bank or
depositary bank that handles a
returned check, to return checks
expeditiously. A check is generally
considered to be returned expedi-
tiously if the return meets either
the so-called "two-day/four-day"
test or "forward-collection" test.
Under the two-day/four-day test, a
check is considered to be returned
expeditiously if the paying bank or
returning bank sends the returned
check in a manner such that it
would normally be received by the
depositary bank not later than the
second business day following the
day of presentment of a local
check, or four business days after
the day of presentment of a nonlo-
cal check. Under the forward col-
lection test, a check is considered
to be returned expeditiously if the
return process is generally as fast as
the forward collection process.' 3
Subpart C also imposes endorse-
ment standards on banks that are
designed to assist the identification
of the depositary bank and the
prompt return of checks.' 4
III. FDICIA Amendments
To The EFAA
Since the EFAA was enacted, the
FRB and the banking industry
have lobbied Congress to amend
the EFAA in certain respects to
ease the burdens on banks and to
reduce the risks of losses due to
check fraud resulting from the
EFAA's requirements. Congress
recently passed several of these
amendments as part of FDICIA.
Under FDICIA, Congress amend-
ed the EFAA to make permanent
the treatment of deposits at non-
proprietary ATMs as nonlocal
checks, to allow banks to invoke
safeguard exceptions for deposits
of next-day availability items, and
to modify the safeguard exception
notice requirements. The FRB has
published proposed or interim
rules to implement these legislative
changes.
A. Deposits at Nonproprietary
ATMs
The EFAA directed the FRB to
report to Congress in 1988, 1989,
and 1990 (collectively, the "ATM
Reports") concerning ATM tech-
nology and the potential for banks
to comply with the permanent
availability schedule mandated by
the EFAA with respect to deposits
made at nonproprietary ATMs.'5
As originally enacted, the EFAA
required banks to treat nonpropri-
etary ATM deposits under the per-
manent availability schedule as if
such deposits were deposited to a
teller. Thus, such deposits would
become available to the customer
on a next day, two-day, or five-day
basis, depending upon the factors
discussed above.
The ATM Reports observed that
special problems arise with depos-
its made at nonproprietary ATMs,
because it is often the case that the
ATM operator, rather than the
depositary bank, initially handles
and processes deposited checks.
Because the depositary bank does
not know the composition of de-
posits at the nonproprietary ATM,
the depositary bank is unable to
apply different holds based upon
the type of deposit, and where
appropriate, invoke the availabili-
ty exceptions under the EFAA.
Under the permanent schedule
as originally enacted, the deposi-
tary bank would be forced to pro-
vide funds availability in many
cases before the composition of the
deposits at nonproprietary ATMs
was known to it. This requirement
could potentially subject deposi-
tary banks to an unacceptable level
of risk from check fraud and, ac-
cordingly, could result in banks no
longer permitting their customers
to make check deposits at nonpro-
prietary ATMs. Given that ATM
technology did not enable banks to
ascertain the composition of non-
proprietary ATM deposits, the
ATM Reports recommended that
Congress amend the EFAA to treat
nonproprietary ATM deposits un-
der the permanent schedule the
same as under the temporary
schedule that treated such deposits
as nonlocal checks for purposes of
funds availability. In 1990, Con-
gress partially adopted this recom-
mendation as part of the Cranston-
Gonzalez National Affordable
Housing Act. 16
(continued on page 114)
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Congress revisited the issue of
nonproprietary ATM deposits in
1991. Under Section 227 of FDI-
CIA, Congress made permanent
the treatment of deposits at non-
proprietary ATMs as nonlocal
checks permanent.17 Thus, banks
will continue to be able to make
deposits made at nonproprietary
ATMs available for withdrawal up
to the fifth business day after the
day of deposit. The FRB published
a proposed rule implementing this
change in January, 1992.18 This
change to the EFAA and Regula-
tion CC will enable banks to con-
tinue to permit their customers to
make check deposits at nonpropri-
etary ATMs.
B. Safeguard Exceptions
The EFAA and Regulation CC
allow banks to invoke certain ex-
ceptions to the mandated funds
availability schedules for new ac-
counts, large dollar check deposits,
redeposited checks, repeatedly
overdrawn accounts, where rea-
sonable cause exists to believe a
deposited check is uncollectible,
and under certain emergency con-
ditions. However, in exercising a
safeguard exception, the deposi-
tary bank had to provide notice to
the depositor according to the
EFAA's requirements. Additional-
ly, the original EFAA requirements
generally allowed banks to apply
most safeguard exceptions only to
local and nonlocal checks, and not
to so-called next-day items.
FDICIA amended the rules re-
garding safeguard exceptions in
two respects. First, the EFAA was
amended to permit banks to apply
the safeguard exceptions to items
for which next-day funds availabil-
ity is required. Thus, banks are
now able to apply safeguard excep-
tions to government checks, "on-
us" checks, cashier's checks, certi-
fied checks, and teller's checks.
Second, FDICIA amended the
EFAA to liberalize the safeguard
exception notice requirements.
Under the EFAA as originally en-
acted, a bank was required to pro-
vide notice to its customer for each
check for which the bank deter-
mined to apply a safeguard excep-
tion. Under the recent FDICIA
amendments to the EFAA, a de-
positary bank may now provide a
one-time notice concerning the
large dollar and redeposited check
exceptions in the cases of noncon-
sumer accounts and other classes
of accounts as defined by the FRB.
A depositary bank also may pro-
vide a one-time notice of the appli-
cability of the repeatedly over-
drawn account exception at the
beginning of each time period dur-
ing which the exception applies. 19
The FRB published an interim
rule implementing these changes in
January, 1992.20 The FRB request-
ed comment on whether the one-
time notice provision for large de-
posit and redeposited check excep-
tions should be extended to certain
classes of consumer accounts, such
as accounts with high balances or
accounts that generally have a large
number of daily aggregate deposits
of checks exceeding $5,000. As of
the time of the preparation of this
Article, the FRB has not taken
further action on this proposal.
IV. Payments Netting
Many banks that regularly clear
payments, whether in paper or
electronic form, do so through
clearinghouses. Contractual net-
ting arrangements normally govern
the amounts clearinghouse mem-
bers pay to, or receive from, other
members on any given settlement
day. Generally a member would
pay only the excess, if any, of the
amount it owes to other members
of the clearinghouse over the
amounts the other members owe it.
Conversely, the member would re-
ceive only the excess, if any, it is
owed by other members of the
clearinghouse over the amount it
owes the others.
Inherent in any such clearing-
house arrangement is the risk that
a member of the clearinghouse will
be unable or unwilling to honor its
settlement obligations. A failed
member, or its receiver, which
would include the FDIC in the case
of a failed federally insured bank,
conceivably could attempt in effect
to repudiate the netting arrange-
ment by collecting the gross
amounts due from other clearing-
house members while failing to pay
its obligations to the other mem-
bers. In this scenario, members
participating in the clearinghouse
arrangement with the failed mem-
ber would end up paying the gross
amount each owed to the failed
member, while being left in the
position of unsecured creditors in
their claims against the failed
member. The failure of one mem-
ber of a clearinghouse can cause
so-called systemic problems, as the
other members' payments of their
gross, rather than net, obligations
to the failed member could cause
these other members, in turn, to
fail to meet their own settlement
obligations.
To reduce this risk, FDICIA ex-
pressly ratified, as a matter of feder-
al law, bilateral and certain qualify-
ing multilateral payments netting
arrangements, including net settle-
ment arrangements of certain de-
fined "clearing organizations." ' 2 1
For a "clearing organization" to
qualify for this treatment, the mem-
bers and participants in the clearing
organization must consist solely of
(i) FDIC-insured (or eligible for
FDIC insurance) banks, mutual
savings banks, savings banks and
savings associations, (ii) federally
insured (or eligible for insurance)
credit unions, (iii) Federal Home
Loan Bank system members, (iv)
certain U.S. branches and agencies
of foreign banks, (v) Edge Act cor-
porations, (vi) brokers or dealers,
(vii) futures commissions mer-
chants, or (viii) other institutions
approved by the FRB.22
If the members and participants
of a clearinghouse fall within these
categories, the receiver or conser-
vator of a failed member of that
clearinghouse will be expressly
prohibited under FDICIA from
repudiating the clearinghouse's net
settlement arrangement. 23 Clear-
inghouse members would still be at
risk for any net, but not gross,
amount owed by a failed member
on the settlement day on which the
member failed. For clearing orga-
nizations with at least one member
or participant other than the clear-
ing organization itself which does
not fall within the above catego-
ries, preexisting law would contin-
ue to apply. It is important to note
that under applicable law other
than FDICIA, such as contract law,
it would appear quite likely that a
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netting arrangement of a clearing-
house or other payment system
that does not qualify as a "clearing
organization" under FDICIA
would be enforceable.
V. Regulation of Interbank
Exposure
In further addressing the con-
cern that the failure of a large
depositary institution could cause
the failure of other depositary in-
stitutions owed money by the
failed depositary institution, which
in turn could cause the failure of
still other depositary institutions,
FDICIA gives the FRB the authori-
ty to prescribe standards limiting
inter-depositary institution expo-
sure. Exposure is defined under
this section of FDICIA to mean (i)
all extensions of credit to other
depositary institutions, (ii) all pur-
chases of or investments in securi-
ties issued by other depositary in-
stitutions, (iii) all securities issued
by other depositary institutions
when used as collateral for other
extensions of credit, and (iv) simi-
lar transactions determined by the
FRB to give rise to exposure. The
FRB is authorized to exempt trans-
actions from the definition of ex-
posure if it finds the exemptions
are in the public interest and con-
sistent with the purposes of this
section.2 4 These provisions be-
come effective on December 19,
1992.25
In July, 1992, the FRB pub-
lished a proposed rule to imple-
ment these interbank liability pro-
visions. 26 The proposed rule would
apply to banks, savings associa-
tions, and branches of foreign
banks with deposits insured by the
FDIC which are all referred to for
the purposes of this discussion as
banks.
The proposed rule would re-
quire banks to develop and imple-
ment internal procedures to evalu-
ate and control exposure to the
depositary institutions with which
they do business, which are re-
ferred to under the proposed rule
as correspondents. The proposed
rule would require a bank's proce-
dures to include limits on both
credit and settlement exposure to
each correspondent. The proposed
rule also would establish bench-
mark guidelines for daily interday
Volume 4 Number 4/Fall, 1992
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credit exposure to individual cor-
respondents within which a bank
ordinarily would be expected to
remain, which would be stated as a
percentage of the exposed bank's
capital. The benchmarks also
would depend on the capital posi-
tion of the correspondent with
which the bank was dealing.
Under these benchmark guide-
lines, a bank generally would be
required to limit its credit expo-
sure to an individual correspon-
dent to an amount not exceeding
25 percent of the exposed bank's
total capital. However, where the
correspondent is "adequately capi-
talized", the bank's credit expo-
sure to the correspondent could be
up to an amount equal to 50
percent of the exposed bank's total
capital, but credit exposure with a
term to maturity of more than 30
days would be limited to not more
than 25 percent of capital. 27 The
proposed rule provides no bench-
mark for credit exposure to "well
capitalized" correspondents. 28 In
all cases, however, a bank would be
expected to establish prudential
limits internally within or in addi-
tion to the benchmarks.
Under the proposed rule, credit
exposure to a correspondent would
include assets and off-balance
sheet items against which the ex-
posed bank must carry capital un-
der the risk-based capital guide-
lines. The proposed rule would
exclude certain transactions, in-
cluding the proceeds of checks and
other cash items deposited in an
account at a correspondent that are
not yet available for withdrawal,
certain fully-secured transactions
and transactions with affiliated
banks. The proposed rule would
permit netting of obligations under
legally valid and enforceable net-
ting contracts.29 The proposed rule
also provides for a two-year trans-
action period after the effective
date for implementation of the
rule. The FRB anticipates an effec-
tive date of December 19, 1992.30
The proposed rule could have a
substantial impact on the pay-
ments system. It would, at a mini-
mum, force banks to increase
greatly their current monitoring of
interbank liabilities. Banks that
currently do not closely oversee
their interbank exposure would be
required to implement procedures
to limit such exposure and to re-
view interbank credit on an ongo-
ing basis. Additionally, the pro-
posed rule could place relatively
weakly capitalized depositary in-
stitutions at a significant competi-
tive disadvantage with respect to
"well capitalized" and even "ade-
quately capitalized" institutions,
because lending banks would be
required to be much more careful
in extending credit to thinly capi-
talized banks. The proposal also
could, in certain instances, place
correspondent private sector banks
at a competitive disadvantage with
respect to Federal Reserve Banks,
because exposure to Federal Re-
serve Banks, which cannot fail, is
not included in the limitations
described above. In general, these
provisions would increase banks'
administrative, record-keeping
and transaction costs in the area of
interbank credits and liabilities,
including overnight credits and lia-
bilities arising in connection with
certain payments activities.
VI. Provisions Dropped From
Earlier Bills
Not all the payments system
provisions contained in earlier ver-
sions of the comprehensive bank
reform bill considered by Congress
survived to enactment. For in-
stance, an earlier version of the
banking bill considered by the
House of Representatives would
have prohibited the use of certain
check endorsements as authoriza-
tions to make subsequent electron-
ic fund transfers. Earlier versions
of the banking bill considered by
the Senate would have applied a
statute of limitations to actions by
the United States in connection
with electronic fund transfers re-
ceived by unauthorized parties.
Earlier versions of the Senate bill
also would have amended the
EFAA to require banks to give
next-day funds availability to cer-
tain deposits at unstaffed loca-
tions, to expand the FRB's authori-
ty to allocate liability among
participants in the payments sys-
tem, including liability for finance
charges, reasonable attorneys' fees
and other expenses related to a
deposited check, and to require
(continued on page 116)
Loyola Consumer Law Reporter
FDICIA
(continued from page 115)
banks to cash government checks
for noncustomers. FDICIA did not
include any of these provisions;
however, these provisions could
appear in future legislation.
VII. Conclusion
Although largely overlooked to
date, the provisions of FDICIA
relating to our payments system
discussed in this Article will have a
substantial impact on the rights
and liabilities of banks and their
corporate, business and individual
consumers. The users of our pay-
ments system must become famil-
iar with these statutory provisions,
as well as the upcoming regulatory
implementation of these statutory
provisions to assure their transac-
tions will provide the best access to
their funds while complying with
the law.
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